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Stockel: United States v. Virginia

UNITED STATES v. VIRGINIA: DOES
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY STILL EXIST?

INTRODUCTION

It is well-settled that separate but equal does not apply to
classifications based upon race in public schools. 1 Now, after the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Virginia2
[hereinafter "Virginia"], this doctrine appears to apply to
educational facilities at the college level. In Virginia, the Court
determined that the male-only admissions policy of the statefunded Virginia Military Institute violated the Equal Protection
3
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Virginia Military Institute [hereinafter "VMI"] is a fouryear military college located in Lexington, Virginia. VMI was
established in 1839 "to produce 'citizen-soldiers,' men prepared
for leadership in civilian life and in military service. VINil
pursues this mission through pervasive training of a kind not

1. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemenied by,
349 U.S. 294 (1955). In Brown, the Court declared that "education is perhaps

the most important function of state and local governments." Id. at 493. The
Court held that racial segregation "generates [in black students] a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone ....

We conclude that in the field

of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." Id. at
494-95. However, this holding had been limited to racial classifications. See,
e.g., Vorchheimer v. School District, 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1976)
(implicitly endorsing the notion of separate but equal for gender classifications
because this type of classification benefits one gender by providing
opportunities not otherwise available), afftd, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
2. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
3. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This
amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
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available anywhere else in Virginia." 4 Since its establishment,
VMI has continuously been financially supported by the
Commonwealth of Virginia [hereinafter the "Commonwealth"]
5
and "subject to the control of the Virginia General Assembly. "

In 1991, the Civil Rights Division of the United States
Department of Justice brought suit against VMI and the
Commonwealth after a female high-school student, who was

denied admission to VMI, filed a complaint with the United
States Attorney General. 6 The District Court found in favor of

VMI 7 [hereinafter VMI/].8

Following this decision, the Justice Department appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The

4. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2269.
5. Id. at 2270 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 23-92 (1993)). This statute
states that "[tihe VMI Board of Visitors decides the admissions policy of VMI.
The seventeen members of this Board are appointed by the Governor of
Virginia, subject to approval by the General Assembly, including the State
Adjutant General, who is a member ex officio .... Twelve of the members
must be VMI alumni." Va. Code Ann. § 23-92 (1993).
6. The student was asserting that she was denied the right to attend the
institution because of her gender. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2271.
7. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1415 (W.D. Va.
1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431
(1993). The court held that VMI could continue its admission policy because
the unique method of instruction in the single-gender environment at VMI
yielded substantial benefits to those attending, such as increased intellectual
self-esteem, increased academic involvement, more frequent interaction with
faculty, a likelihood of a substantially higher starting salary in business, and an
increased likelihood of carrying out plans for a career in law, college teaching
and business. Id. at 1412.
In actuality, this very issue regarding single-sex admission policies in
a state-funded institution was almost addressed by the Court in Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan fourteen years earlier. See 458 U.S. 718, 720 n. 1
(1982) ("Mississippi maintains no other single-sex public university or
college. Thus, we are not faced with the question of whether States can
provide 'separate but equal' undergraduate institutions for males and
females.").
8. VMI I includes: United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D.
Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2431 (1993).
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Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, 9 finding the
school's policy unconstitutional. 10 In so remanding, the circuit
court instructed the district court to allow the Commonwealth
time to develop a plan to address the constitutional violation and
develop a remedy which will comport with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 1
Pursuant to the mandate of the Fourth Circuit, the
Commonwealth developed a plan to establish an all-female,
publicly-funded military college which would provide a singlesex education similar to that of VMI. 12 Both the district court
and the circuit court found the proposal satisfied the
Constitutional requirements and upheld the admission policy
13
[hereinafter VMI I].
Once again, the Justice Department appealed and the United
States Supreme Court granted the Justice Department's request
for certiorari. 14 After oral argument, the Court held: (a) the
Commonwealth had failed to provide a justification for excluding
women from the program offered at VMI; (b) the
Commonwealth's proposal to create the Virginia Woman's
Institute for Leadership [hereinafter "VWIL"] did not afford
9. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
10. Id. at 898-900. The court held that VMI had failed to show that its
admission policy was substantially related to the benefits of a single-sex
education. Id. The court stated that "[it is not the maleness, as distinguished
from femaleness, that provides justification for the program. It is the
homogeneity of gender in the process, regardless of... sex... that has been
shown to be related to the essence of the education and training at VMI." Id.
at 897. Based on this analysis, the court was of the opinion that the
Commonwealth had not provided a sufficient justification for the gender
classification. Id. at 897-99.
11. Id. at 900.
12. The plan called for the establishment of the Virginia Woman's Institute
for Leadership [hereinafter "VWIL]. VWIL would be located at Mary
Baldwin College, a private liberal arts college for women. United States v.
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2282-83 (1996).
13. VMI II includes: United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D.
Va. 1994), aff'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281
(1995).
14. 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
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women comparable benefits to those offered at VMI; and (c) the
Fourth Circuit erred in its use of a deferential standard of
review. 15 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the initial judgment
of the Fourth Circuit (VMI I), reversed the final judgment of the
Fourth Circuit (VMI II) and remanded the case. 16
This note will initially summarize the history of gender
discrimination jurisprudence in this country over the past fifty
years. 17
It will then analyze the deferential standard of
intermediate scrutiny utilized by the Fourth Circuit in VMI 1118
and finally, it will discuss the Supreme Court's decision to reject
that standard and adopt what appears to be a heightened standard
19
of intermediate scrutiny.
I. A SYNOPSIS OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION
JURISPRUDENCE
Historically, the legal standard for determining the
constitutionality of gender based classifications has been rational
basis review. 20
Under this standard, a classification is
considered constitutional if it is rationally related to a legitimate

15. 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2287 (1996).
16. Id.
17. See infra notes 20 - 55 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 56 - 131 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 132 - 188 and accompanying text.
20. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973) ("Under
'traditional' equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be
sustained unless it is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest."). See also, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948), overruled by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Goesaert,
the Court upheld a Michigan statute which prohibited any female from
becoming a bartender, expect those who were either married to or the daughter
of a male owner of the establishment. Id. at 465. In reviewing the statute, the
Court stated that "Michigan cannot play favorites among women without
rhyme or reason. The Constitution ...precludes irrationaldiscrimination as
between persons or group of persons ....If [the rationality of the statute] is
entertainable .... [the state] has not violated its duty to afford equal
protection of its laws." Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
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governmental objective. 2 1 It was not until the 1970's that the
Supreme Court looked more closely at the dissimilar treatment
between the sexes.
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court, for the first time,
held that a state law which discriminated against women was
unconstitutional. 22 In Reed v. Reed, 23 the Court held that a
mandatory provision of an Idaho statute, which gave preference
to men over women for appointments as administrators of estates,
The Court
was an unconstitutional gender classification. 24
convenience
administrative
that
State's
argument
the
rejected
could justify the inconsistency with the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 Although the Court did not
formulate a new standard of review, it was clear they had
26
rejected the rational basis test previously used.
In Frontierov. Richardson,2 7 a plurality of the Court explicitly
adopted a heightened level of judicial scrutiny when it invalidated
a rule that automatically permitted servicemen to claim their
spouses as dependents for certain benefits while servicewomen
had to prove that their spouses were actually dependent upon
them before benefits were conferred upon the spouse. 2 8 The
plurality agreed with the appellants that classifications based upon
gender are "inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to
21. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). In Hoyt, the Court
held that Florida's restriction of jury service to males was "based on some
reasonable classification" and thus it was not -infected with
unconstitutionality." Id. at 61.

22. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 77.
25. Id. at 76. In rejecting this argument, the Court was of the opinion that
giving "mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the
other, merely to accomplish the elimination of [appointment] hearings on the
merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
26. In rejecting the statutory appendage as unconstitutional, the Court
reinforced the objective of the original statute, which was to establish lists of
classes of persons entitled to compete for letters of administration, regardless
of their gender. Id. at 77.
27. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
28. Id. at 682.
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close judicial scrutiny." 2 9 However, since only four justices
joined in the adoption of strict scrutiny, 30 the question of which
31
standard to apply to gender classifications was left unresolved.
This lack of guidance from the Court was finally clarified in
1976. In Craig v. Boren, 32 a majority of the Court adopted an
intermediate standard of judicial scrutiny for discrimination based
upon gender. 33 Under this intermediate standard, a classification
based upon sex must "serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. "34
The Craig Court invalidated an Oklahoma law which allowed
the sale of 3.2% beer to women over eighteen years of age while
restricting the sale of the same beer to males over the age of
twenty-one. 35 The Court accepted the claim of the Oklahoma
Attorney General that the regulation of traffic safety, more
specifically, the problems associated with driving under the
36
influence of alcohol, was an important governmental objective.
However, the majority was of the opinion that the statistical
evidence offered by the State was not sufficient enough to
demonstrate that there was a substantial relationship between the
promotion of traffic safety and the gender classification of the
statute. 37 The statistics offered by the State showed that 2% of
29. Id. The Court was of the opinion that a departure from rational basis
review with regard to classifications based upon sex was "clearly justified."
Id. at 684.
30. Only Justices Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall joined in the
plurality opinion.

31. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, agreed with the outcome of the case but refused
to adopt the strict scrutiny standard because he felt that the case could have
been decided under Reed without categorizing sex as a suspect classification.
Id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
32. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
33. Id. at 197.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 199.

36. Id. The Court conceded that the protection of public health and safety
will always satisfy the requirement that an important governmental objective

exists. Id. at 199-200.
37. Id. at 200.
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males between the ages of eighteen and twenty were arrested for
drunk driving, while only .18% of females in the same age group
were arrested. 38 The Court stated that "while such a disparity is
not trivial in a statistical sense, it hardly can form the basis for
employment of a gender line as a classifying device." 39 The
Court found the "normative philosophy" underlying the Equal
Protection Clause far surpasses the skepticism of a statistical
40
analysis of broad social propositions.
Since the formulation of the initial intermediate standard in

Craig, the Court has pronounced a more stringent intermediate
standard of review. 4 1 This modified standard requires that a
state, in seeking to uphold a statute which is based upon a sex-

based classification, must provide "an exceedingly persuasive
justification" for the classification. 42
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,4 3 the State of

Mississippi sought to uphold the female-only admissions policy at
the Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing
[hereinafter "MUW"] on the grounds that the admissions policy
was designed to compensate for past discrimination against
women,

and

therefore,

constituted

educational

affirmative

38. Id. at 201. These numbers, the Court acknowledged, are quite
substantial in that 427 males were arrested for driving under the influence as
compared to only 24 female arrests. Id. at 200 n.8.
39. Id. at 201.
40. Id. at 204. The Court further illustrated the danger of relying on the
statistical analysis of the state alcohol regulation when it posed the hypothetical
of the logistics of "states [freely favoring] Jews and Italian Catholics at the
expense of all other Americans, since available studies regularly demonstrate
that the former two groups exhibit the lowest rate of problem drinking." Id. at
208 n.22.
41. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (stating
that the in order to overcome the expressed gender-based discrimination of a
statute, a party must prove the statute is justified and furthers an important
governmental interest); Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 273 (1979) (stating that the existence of an exceedingly persuasive
justification will defeat an attack based upon the Equal Protection Clause).
42. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718. 724
(1982).
43. Id.
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action. 44 After applying this modified intermediate scrutiny
standard, the Hogan Court struck down the statute, finding the
exclusion did not serve the compensatory purpose proffered by
45
the State.
According to the Court, a state "can evoke a compensatory
purpose to justify al otherwise discriminatory classification only
if members of the gender benefited by the classification actually
suffer a disadvantage related to the classification." '4 6 Thus, in
order to pass constitutional muster, Mississippi had to prove that
the opportunity to obtain training in the field of nursing was not
available to women.
In concluding the State had not made such a showing, the
Court pointed to statistics which demonstrated that "women
earned 94% of the nursing baccalaureate degrees conferred in
Mississippi and 98.6% of the degrees earned nationwide." ' 47 In
holding the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court noted that "MUW's policy of excluding males from
admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job"
rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers aimed at
48
women in the nursing field.
Twelve years later, the Court once again had the opportunity to
examine the intermediate scrutiny standard in J.E.B. v.
Alabama.49 In J.E.B., the Court held that a gender-based
44. Id. at 727. The lawsuit was brought by Joe Hogan, a male who had
sought admission to the baccalaureate program at the MUW School of

Nursing. Id. at 720. He was denied admission solely on the basis of his sex,
even though his qualifications equaled those of the admitted women. Id, at
720-2 1.
45. Id. at 730.
46. Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 729 (citing U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,

Earned Degrees Conferred: 1969 - 1970, Institutional Data 388 (1972)). In
addition, the statistics showed that nearly 98% of all employed registered
nurses were female. Id.
48. Id.

49. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). In J.E.B., a putative father appealed an order
which found him to be the father of a child on the grounds that the State
unconstitutionally used its peremptory challenges to exclude men from the
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peremptory challenge, used in an effort to remove members of
one sex from a jury, was unconstitutional. 50 The State attempted
to justify the use of peremptory challenges to remove men from
the jury in a paternity case on grounds that women were more
likely to be sympathetic to the arguments of the female plaintiff
51
who bore the child in such cases.
In reaffirming the intermediate scrutiny standard developed in
Hogan, the Court noted that "our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination, a history which
warrants the heightened scrutiny we afford all gender-based
classifications today."52 The Court rejected the assertion by the
State that its use of the peremptory challenges was substantially
related to the State's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and
impartial jury and stated "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional
proxy for juror competence and impartiality" 53 and the proposed
justification was "the very stereotypeo] the law condemns."

Although

the

standard

of

review

for

54

gender-based

discrimination has remained consistent for approximately the past
fifteen years, it is important to note that twice the Supreme Court
has gone out of its way to mention there is a distinct possibility

that strict scrutiny may be adopted for review of gender
55
classifications in the future.

jury. Id. at 1422. The State had used nine of its ten peremptory challenges to
remove men from the panel, resulting in an all-female jury. Id.
50. Id. at 1430. "[Plotential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal
protection right to jury selection procedures that are free from state-sponsored
group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice." Id. at
1421.
51. Id. at 1426.
52. Id. at 1425 (citations omitted). Thus, the only question the J.E.B.
Court needed to consider was whether the use of peremptory challenges in an
effort to remove members of one sex from a jury furthered the State's
legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial jury. Id.
53. Id. at 1421.
54. Id.

55. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9
(1982) ("Because we conclude that the challenged statutory classification is not
substantially related to an important objective, we need not decide whether
classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect."); J.E.B., 114 S. Ct.
at 1425 n.6 ("Because we conclude that gender-based peremptory challenges
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II. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ADOPTED BY THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT IN VMI II

Since Craig, the United States Supreme Court has looked
unfavorably upon gender discrimination and has performed a
searching examination when scrutinizing such classifications. 56
However, lower federal courts have not been as consistent.

History demonstrates there has been widespread confusion and
variations with regard to the outcome of gender discrimination

cases among the lower courts. 57 Lower courts generally express
the view that the Supreme Court has failed to provide sufficient
guidance regarding intermediate scrutiny and as a result,
individual judges are left to decide what constitutes a legitimate
state objective and whether the classification is substantially
related to that objective. 5 8 A good example of this result can be
found by examining the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in VMI I and VMI II. However, before this
are not substantially related to an important government objective, we once
again need not decide whether classifications based on gender are inherently
suspect.").
56. See, e.g., Lamprecht v. Federal Communications Commission, 958
F.2d 382, 398 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (concluding that although the Court found
that the adoption of a rational basis or strict standard of review would have
marginally allowed for less error, the Court chose to follow the intermediate
scrutiny standard which requires a form of 'line-drawing' as to the degree of
correlation needed to satisfy equal protection); Associated Gen. Contractors of
Cal., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 939 (9th Cir.
1987) (stating that in order to protect and reconcile the rights and interests of
citizens, neutral remedial measures must first be exhausted "before resorting to
race-conscious ones."); Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 604 (1st Cir.
1977) ("The statute at issue.., is a classification based on sex. As such it
requires a more heightened scrutiny than would be applied to completely nonsuspect legislation, but less stringent scrutiny than is typically applied to racial
classifications."), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978).
57. See Contractors Assoc. of Eastern Penn., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,
6 F.3d 990, 1010 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The Supreme Court gender-preference
cases
are inconclusive ... [and]
its decisions
are difficult
to
reconcile . . . ").

58. Id. ("Lower court cases are similarly diverse.").
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example of confusion and inconsistency can be demonstrated, it is
necessary to examine each of these decisions individually.
A. THE LIBILITY STAGE - A LOOK AT VM1 I
In 1991, the United States sued the Commonwealth, VMI, and
others in federal district court, challenging the school's all-male
admission policy on the ground it violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 59 The court, in holding the admissions policy to be
constitutional, found that VMI's single-gender policy and unique
and strenuous educational method constituted a legitimate state
objective by providing diversity in Virginia's higher educational
system and that the across-the-board exclusion of females was
60
substantially related to that objective.
After considering the evidence presented during the six day
trial, 6 1 the court recognized that diversity in education achieved
through a single-gender environment, constitutes a legitimate and
important state objective. 62 The court found that VMI had
presented sufficient proof that a single gender education at the
college level is beneficial to both sexes 63 and that the admission
of women would "distract the male students from their
studies." 64 In addition, the court determined that if the system
were to be altered by the admission of females, life at VI
59. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991).
vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993),
aff'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995), rer'd,
116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).

60. Id. at 1413.
61. The evidence presented consisted of the testimony of "[nlineteen

witnesses... including four experts on education, one expert on college
facilities, and one expert on human physiology." Id. at 1408. Included in the

court's opinion is a 29 page appendix containing the findings of facts. Id. at
1415-43.

62. Id. at 1411 ("[Dliversity in education has been recognized both
judicially and by education experts as being a legitimate objective. The sole
way to attain single-gender diversity is to maintain a policy of admitting only
one gender to an institution.").
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1412.
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would be drastically changed. 65 In concluding that VMI has met
its burden of proof by showing a substantial relationship between
the classification and the state's objective, the court stated that:
VMI is a different type of institution. It has set its eye on the
goal of citizen-solider and never veered from that path it has
chosen to meet that goal. VMI truly marches to the beat of a
different drummer, and I will permit it to continue to do so. 66
The United States appealed 67 and the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court finding that VMI's
unique education justifies a single-gender environment and
important aspects of that education would be drastically changed
by coeducation. 68 However, the circuit court did not agree that
the Commonwealth had "advanced any state policy by which it
can justify its determination, under an announced policy of
diversity, to afford VMI's unique type of program to men and
69
not to women."
However, in making such a determination, the court admittedly
found itself in a "Catch-22" in that "women are denied the
opportunity [offered to males] when excluded from VMI and
cannot be given the opportunity [offered to males] by admitting
them, because the change caused by their admission would
destroy the opportunity." ' 70 More specifically, the appellate
court agreed that coeducation at VMI would destroy the
adversative method of teaching because the same results would
not be produced; would cause a fundamental change to the
65. Id. "[T]he evidence establishes that key elements of the adversative
VMI educational system, with its focus on barracks life, would be
fundamentally altered, and the distinctive ends of the system would be
thwarted ...... "Id. at 1411.
66. Id. at 1415.
67. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993), aff'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 281 (1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
68. Id. at 892. The court stated that "the record supports the conclusion
that single-sex education is pedagogically justifiable, and VMI's system, which
the district court found to include a holistic formula of training, even more
so." Id. at 898.
69. Id. at 892.
70. Id. at 897.
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absence of privacy found to be essential to the leveling process;
and would force VMI to modify its physical training program.71
Having determined that VMI failed to explain how the
existence of a single-gender institution furthers the governmental
objective of a diversified education through such an admission's
policy, the court was left with three conclusions:
(1) single-gender education, and VMI's program in particular, is
justified by a legitimate and relevant institutional mission which
favors neither sex; (2) the introduction of women at VMI will
materially alter the very program in which women seek to
partake; and (3) the Commonwealth of Virginia, despite its
announced policy of diversity, has failed to articulate an
important policy that substantially supports offering the unique
benefits of a VMI-type of education to men and not to women
.... [therefore] [e]vidence of a legitimate and substantial state
72
purpose is lacking.
Having reached its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit remanded the
case with instructions to allow the Commonwealth time to
develop a plan which will provide females the opportunity to
receive an education similar to that available at VMI. 73 The
court emphasized this plan must address the constitutional
violation and conform with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 74 The court provided several examples
of remedies available to the Commonwealth, such as:
admit[ing] women to VMI and adjust[ing] the program to
implement that choice, or it might establish parallel institutions
or parallel programs, or it might abandon state support of VMI,
leaving VMI the option to pursue its own policies as a private
institution .... [and] there might be other more creative options
75
or combinations.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 899-900. As a result of these findings, the Fourth Circuit did not

order VMI to admit women until it was determined that there were no other
alternatives available.
73. Id. at 900.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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B. THE REMEDIAL STAGE - A LOOK AT VMI II
Although the mandate of the Fourth Circuit in VMI I seemed
clear, the parties substantially disagreed with regard to what the
Fourth Circuit required by the remanding instructions. 76 The
Commonwealth claimed the instructions meant that a statefunded, all-female institution provides a comparable atmosphere
and education to that of VMI must be founded. 77 The United
States viewed the instructions as requiring the Commonwealth to
either admit women to VMI or, in the alternative, develop a
separate program which "must be in all respects equivalent to,
78
i.e. a mirror image of, the VMI program."
Based on its interpretation of the court's mandate, the
Commonwealth proposed the establishment of the Virginia
79
Women's Institute for Leadership at Mary Baldwin College.
This plan was designed to provide women with a single-gender
education, coupled with special leadership training, 80 to produce
"citizen soldiers who are educated and honorable women,
prepared for varied work of civil life, qualified to serve the
armed forces, imbued with love of learning, confident in the
functions and attitudes of leadership, and possessing a high sense
of public service." ' 81 VWIL's mission was to be based upon that
of VMI in that students pursue the same five goals, which are
"education, military training, mental and physical discipline,
character development, and leadership development.' 82
However, the task force established to develop the VWIL
program concluded that certain aspects of a VMI education,
76. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 473 (W.D. Va.
1994), aff'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
77. Id. at 473.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 476.
80. Id. The program would be based on "a cooperative method which

reinforces self-esteem rather than the leveling process used by VMI." Brief for
the Petitioner at 8, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 941941).
81. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1233 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
82. Id.
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specifically the adversative method, would not be included in the
VWIL program because they believed this would not be effective
for "women as a group." 83 Based on this belief, several aspects
of the VWIL program differed from that offered at VMI. For
example, VWIL's curriculum and environment will be different
from the militaristic experience received at VMI in that students
at VWIL, in addition to having to take several required courses in
leadership training, 84 must participate in four years of ROTC
training and in ROTC summer camp. 85 VWIL does not require
students to wear uniforms except in the required ROTC
training. 86 Moreover, students at VWIL would be required to
live in VWIL housing for one year and the housing will not be
87
operated in a military format.

On remand, the district court determined that the
88
Commonwealth's proposed plan passed constitutional muster.
The court rejected the United States' understanding of the Fourth

Circuit's instructions in VMI I by stating that such a reading
would require the creation of a 'separate but equal' program and
the court of appeals did not contemplate such an interpretation. 8 9

83. Id. The task force determined that the goals of VWIL could better be
achieved by using an environment that centered on leadership training rather
than a 'rat line.' Id. at 1234. A leading expert on the education of women
stated that the "adversative method of teaching in an all-female school would
be not only inappropriate for most women, but counter productive." Virginia,
852 F. Supp. at 476.
84. Id. at 477. The curriculum at VWIL is grounded upon public service
and leadership. Id. at 478. Every student is required to participate in a
leadership externship program. Id. at 495. This leadership externship "should
be ideally related to [the students'] major, will be distinguished from other
externships by providing an opportunity to experience and reflect upon
leadership in practice." Id.
85. Id. at 497-98.
86. Id. at 495.
87. Id. at 497-98.
88. Id. at 485.
89. Id. at 475. The court noted that the 'separate but equal' concept was
abandoned in Sweatt v. Painter. See 339 U.S. 629 (1950). In Sweatt, the
Court invalidated the admissions policy of the University of Texas Law School
because it denied admission to all black applicants. Id. at 636. The University
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The court further noted that if this was the remedy envisioned
by the circuit court, then the Commonwealth's plan must violate
the Constitution since the VWIL program "cannot supply those
intangible qualities of history, reputation, tradition, and prestige
that VMI has amassed over the years." 90 Having approved the
proposed plan, the district court directed the Commonwealth "to
proceed with all deliberate speed in implementing the Plan and to
have the Plan operational for the academic year commencing in
the Fall of 1995."91
The United States again appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing
that under the proposed plan, women would still be denied the
benefits of VMI's unique educational methodology despite the
similarities between the two programs. 9 2 Claiming the proposed
program must be identical to a VMI education, the United States
argued that, absent such a program, the only acceptable remedy
available to the Commonwealth was admitting women to VMI. 93
In making its determination, the Fourth Circuit found the
application of the traditional intermediate scrutiny test to a
situation where the classification is based on the homogeneity of
gender rather than directed at men or women per se "present[ed]
a unique problem, because once the state's objective is found to
be an important one, the classification by gender is by definition

of Texas offered to establish an all-Negro law school which it claimed would
remedy any constitutional violation, but the Court disagreed and stated:

What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses
to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such
qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty,
experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni,
standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It is difficult to

believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would
consider the question close.

Id. at 634.
90. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 475.

91. Id. at 485.
92. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1235 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).

93. Id.
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necessary for accomplishing the objective and might thereby
94
bypass any equal protection scrutiny."
Thus, the court concluded that an additional step must be taken
to "carefully weigh[] the alternatives available to members of
each gender denied benefits by the classification" 95 and
developed a third prong for the intermediate scrutiny test which it
called the "substantive comparability" test. 96 Under this new
standard, the court had to determine:
(1) whether the state's objective of providing single-gender
education to its citizens may be considered a legitimate and
important governmental objective; (2) whether the gender
classification adopted is directly and substantially related to that
purpose; and (3) whether the resulting mutual exclusion of
women and men from each other's institutions leaves open
opportunities for those ercluded to obtain substantively
comparable benefits at their institution or through other means
offered by the state.'97
After applying this test, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's approval of the proposal. 98 First, the court determined
that a single-gender education constitutes a legitimate and
important governmental objective. 99 In noting that the provision
of education is considered to be one of the most important
functions of a state, 100 the court concluded that a single-gender
94. Id. at 1237. The court noted that the second prong of the test would
therefore "provide little or no scrutiny of the effect of a classification ....

"

Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1239. When making this determination, the court noted that

deference is to be given to the state legislature provided the purpose "is not
pernicious and does not violate traditional notions of the role of government."
Id. at 1237.
100. Id. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)

("Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments."); Stroman v. Colleton County Sch. Dist., 981 F.2d 152, 158

(4th Cir. 1992 ) ("Public education is recognized as one of the most important
public services offered by state government ...

").
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education is an important aspect of a public higher educational
system as well as beneficial to both sexes. 101
Next, the court found that the Commonwealth's gender
classification was substantially related to the purpose of providing
a single-gender education with the benefit that attending students
would be able to enjoy an anxiety-free education without the
presence of the opposite sex. 1 02 The court noted that "[w]hen
combined with the third part of the test, i.e., the inquiry into
whether excluded men and women have opportunities to obtain
substantively comparable benefits, this inquiry scrutinizes the
means by which the state chooses to obtain its objective." 10 3
According to the court, the only way to effectuate the
usefulness of homogeneity of gender is to limit the admission to
members of one sex, thus "the means of classifying by gender are
focused on the single-gender educational purpose as directly as
104
the nature of the objective allows."
The court concluded that in order for the classification to be
constitutional, the students excluded from the programs must
have "reasonable opportunities to obtain benefits substantively
comparable to those they are denied." 105 Therefore, the court
was of the opinion that if VWIL could provide comparable
benefits to those offered at VMI, then the equal protection
violation would be remedied. 106
The court then analyzed the government's argument. The
United States asserted that the VMI educational experience is
unique, can not be replicated, and thus, a separate institution
could not be equal. Accordingly, the government argued that
"women could only enjoy the unique benefits of the VMI

101.
102.
103.
104.

Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1238.
Id. at 1239.
Id.
Id. Moreover, the court found that the classification at VMI is directly

related to accomplishing the goals of a military environment, more specifically
the adversative method. Id.
105. Id. at 1239-40. The court stated that the benefits had to be comparable
in substance and not in form or detail. Id. at 1240.
106. Id. at 1241.
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program if VMI admits women." 107 However, the court failed
to follow this reasoning because once women were to be admitted
to VMI, the program would have to be altered dramatically,
"forever denying its unique methodology to both women and
8
men." 10
Finally, the circuit court examined whether the VMI and VWIL
programs offered substantially comparable benefits to both
genders. 10 9 Comparing the two programs, the court determined
that substantially comparable benefits were available 110 and that
any differences between the programs were attributable to the
demonstrated pedagogical differences between the sexes. I I1
With regard to the intangible qualities of VMI that are necessarily
unavailable at VWIL, such as the history and prestige behind a
VMI degree, the court noted that these benefits are the "by112
product of a longer-term effort."
The court found that the equal protection violation in VMI I
was remedied, since the programs offered at the two institutions
will be substantively comparable if the VWIL program is
"undertaken with a persistently high level of commitment by [the
Commonwealth] and that men and women mutually excluded by
the two programs will not be denied the opportunity for an
undergraduate education with discipline and special training in
107. Id. at 1240.
108. Id. According to the court:
Changes would have to be made to the adversative method, to the

absence of privacy, and to the physical requirements of the program, all
of which are part of VMI's unique methodology. Certainly military
training could be provided for women at VMI, but it would be
substantially different from the training VMI cadets currently receive
.... Thus, neither gender would experience the unique type of
adversative military training now utilized at VMI if VMI were to
become co-educational.
Id.

109. Id.
110. The similarities noted by the court were the provision of a singlegender environment, the offering of a bachelor's degree and the
implementation of a program designed to produce disciplined, honorable
students trained in leadership. Id.
111. Id. at 1242.
112. Id. at 1241.
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leadership." 113 The court further observed that the
Commonwealth offers various opportunities in higher education
through additional state-supported colleges and universities, such
as the coeducational ROTC program offered at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University, more commonly
114
known as Virginia Tech.
Based on the foregoing, the court found that the existing
differences between the programs did "not require that the
important
state
purpose
of
providing
single-gender
education ... be defeated in this case." 115 Thus, the circuit
court affirmed the judgment and remanded the case with
instructions that the district court conduct:
a specific review to ensure that (1) the program is headed by a
well-qualified, motivated administrator, attracted by a level of
compensation suited for the position; (2) the program is wellpromoted to potentially qualified candidates; (3) the program
includes a commitment for adequate funding by the state for the
near term; and (4) the program includes a mechanism for
continuing review by qualified professional educators so that its
elements may be adjusted as necessary to keep the program
aimed not only at providing a quality bachelor's degree but also
at affording the additional element of taught discipline and
16
leadership training for women. 1
In his dissent, Judge Phillips expressed skepticism regarding
the state's proposed remedy. 1 17 He agreed with the government
that the only constitutional remedy to VMI's male-only
admissions policy is either ordering co-education at VMI or
1 18
foregoing further state support for VMI.
Judge Phillips questioned whether separate, state-supported
educational institutions for men and women, like those for white
and black students, are so "inherently unequal" by reason of their
stigmatic implications to the extent that such classifications
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1245 (Phillips, J., dissenting).

118. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
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should be subject to the same strict scrutiny as race-based
classifications. 119
Judge Phillips agreed with the majority's characterization of the
basic structures of both the VWIL and VMI programs, but found
a "real problem" with the Commonwealth's identification of its
important interest used to justify its classifications. 120 He
questioned the genuineness of the objectives asserted by the
Commonwealth, and came to the conclusion that the asserted
governmental objectives suggested by the Commonwealth failed
the standard set out in Hogan.1 2 1 He instead determined that the
asserted governmental interests "are rationalizations compelled by
the exigencies of this litigation rather than an actual overriding
12 2
purpose of the proposed separate-but-equal arrangement."
Given the newly established program at VWIL could not
possibly offer the same benefits that an institution established
before the Civil War could offer under Judge Phillips's
interpretation of the intermediate scrutiny standard, the only
possible conclusion was that VMI's historical, discriminatory
admissions policy could be remedied only through either (1)
abandonment of state support for the VMI or (2) admission of
12 3
women to VI.
Judge Phillips stated the only way a state could constitutionally
establish separate, single-sex institutions, is if those institutions
119. Id. at 1244 (Phillips, J., dissenting). However, Judge Phillips found it

unnecessary to address that question because, in his opinion, the proposed
VWIL plan clearly fails to pass equal protection muster. Id. (Phillips, J.,
dissenting). He remarked at the outset that "[blecause I believe that even were
the VWIL proposal to be substantially consummated in foreseeable time the
resulting two-component arrangement would not pass equal protection muster,
I would proceed on that assumption...." Id. at 1245 (Phillips. J..
dissenting).
120. Id. at 1246 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting). He stated that "[tlhis was exactly what
the Supreme Court did in rejecting the State of Mississippi's assertion in
Hogan that its primary objectives in maintaining its School of Nursing for
women only was to compensate for past discrimination against them." Id.
(Phillips, J., dissenting). See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 1247 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 1243 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
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were established simultaneously and provided "substantially
comparable curricular and extracurricular programs, funding,
physical plant, administration and support services, and faculty
Thus, he concluded that "[n]o
and library resources.' 124
separate single-gender arrangement that involved VMI as the allmens' school and any newly-founded separate institution
(whether free-standing or an appendage) as the all-womens'
component could pass equal protection muster" because "[it

could not provide substantially equal educational benefits or
12 5
opportunities to both genders."
The Fourth Circuit denied the rehearing en banc. 126 In her
dissent, Circuit Judge Motz was of the opinion that this case
presented an extremely important issue 127 and she agreed with
Judge Phillips that the Commonwealth had failed to demonstrate
an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the existence of
differences between the two programs. 128

She attacked the argument that VMI and VWIL were
substantively comparable by focusing on the adversative training
124. Id. at 1250 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting). He further stated that:
[even] if every good thing projected for the VWIL program is realized
in reasonably foreseeable time, it will necessarily be then but a pale
shadow of VMI in terms of the great bulk, if not all of those criteria.
Particularly is this obvious with respect to the intangibles such as
prestige, tradition and alumni influence which the Supreme Court,
looking for substantial equality of educational opportunities in Sweatt,
thought 'more important' even than tangible resources.
Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
126. 52 F.3d 90 (4th Cir. 1995).
127. Id. at 91 (Motz, J., dissenting). She stated:
More than forty years ago the Supreme Court unanimously held that a
state could not constitutionally provide a "separate but equal" education
to African - Americans. Yet in a 2-1 decision, a panel of this court has
now held that a state can constitutionally provide a separate--and
concededly not even equal-- education to women. In my view, this
holding is one of exceptional importance, which merits the careful
consideration of every eligible member of the court.
Id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 92 (Motz, J., dissenting) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
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method. 12 9 In support of her argument, Judge Motz explains that
the:
military academies are apparently able to train soldiers, sailors,
and pilots without the benefit of "adversative" training. It might
even be argued that, since the military academies have
abandoned "adversative" training, the provision of that training
to VMI cadets, rather than preparing them to be leaders in
today's Armed Forces, affirmatively disadvantages them for
military leadership roles.
Assuming, however, that "adversative" training is both
desirable and essential to the VMI program, then the proposed
Mary Baldwin program, which does not include "adversative"
training, cannot be "substantively comparable" to the VMI
program. If "adversative" training is so critical to the VMI
program that it virtually defines it, then a program without
"adversative" training can never be "substantively comparable."
Conversely, if the proposed program at Mary Baldwin is truly
"substantively comparable" to the VMI program, then
"adversative" training must not be critical to the VMI program.
and so there is nothing to prevent the abolition of "adversative"
30
training and admission of women to VMI. 1

Judge Motz concluded that "[w]omen need not be guaranteed
equal 'results' . . . but the Equal Protection Clause does require
equal opportunity to obtain these results; that opportunity is being
13 1
denied here."
129. Id. (Motz, J., dissenting). She claims that majority in VMI 11 "never
demonstrate[d] the 'requisite direct, substantial relationship' between VMI's
asserted objective-producing 'citizen soldiers, educated and honorable'- and
the means employed to accomplish that objective." Id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 92-93 (Motz, ., dissenting). She also asks the question:
[Hlow can a degree from a yet to be implemented supplemental program
at Mary Baldwin be held "substantively comparable" to a degree from a
venerable Virginia military institution that was established more than
150 years ago? As the majority acknowledges, in almost epic
understatement, the alternative degree from [VWIL] "lacks the
historical benefit and prestige of a degree from VMI."
Id. at 93 (Motz, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d
1229, 1241 (4th Cir. 1995)).
131. Id. at 93.
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III. THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Following the Fourth Circuit's denial of the rehearing en banc,
the United States Supreme Court granted the federal
government's petition for certiorari, 132 setting the stage for the
Court to make its first major statement on gender equality in
more than ten years.
In its briefs, the government asked the Court to use the VMI
case as a device for declaring that discrimination on the basis of
sex should be subject to the strict scrutiny standard that the Court
applies to official distinctions on the basis of race. 133 The
government reiterated the position it had taken throughout the
litigation that the Commonwealth must be ordered to admit
women to VMI or to discontinue state funding for the
134
institution.
The Court also granted the Commonwealth's conditional crosspetition for certiorari, which challenged the initial determination
by the Fourth Circuit which ruled that the Commonwealth could
not continue VMI as a male-only public college without
establishing a comparable facility for women. 13 5 In its crosspetition, the Commonwealth argued that equal protection
jurisprudence does not require the Commonwealth to provide the
VWIL program and that the Fourth Circuit's decision in VMI I
"will unduly and unnecessarily inhibit States in the development
of programs to meet the special and demonstrated needs of their
citizens. "136
In challenging the court of appeals decision in VM1 I, the
Commonwealth stated, regardless of the position taken in the
cross-petition, it was "committed by legislation to single-sex
132. 116 S.Ct. 281 (1995).
133. Brief for the Petitioners at 17-18, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct.
2264 (1996) (No. 94-1941).
134. Id. at 7-8, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 941941)
135. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. at 281.
136. Brief for the Cross-Petitioners at 3, United States v. Virginia, 116 S.
Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 94-1941).
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education as a beneficial pedagogical option for both men and
women and intend to continue offering this option through VMI
and VWIL even if [the Supreme] Court holds that parallel
programs are not a prerequisite to a State's ability to offer the
benefits of single-sex education to its citizens." 137
The seven-to-one majority reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding
that VMI's male-only admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
creation of VWIL did not remedy the constitutional violation. 138
The Court considered two issues before concluding the all-male
policy violated equal protection. First, the Court decided that the
exclusion of women from the educational opportunities provided
by VMI denied them equal protection of the laws as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 139 Second, the Court held that
the Commonwealth's proposal to create VWIL also offended the
Equal Protection Clause. 140
The Court stated the Commonwealth was required to
demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its
exclusion of women from VMI and explained that the "[t]he
burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the
state .... The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely
on over-broad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities or preferences of males and females." 14 1
137. Id. at 3 n. 1. The Commonwealth reasoned in its cross-petition that it is
"merely seek[ing] to preserve the discretion of state and local governments to
improve and diversify all levels of their educational systems through
innovative and successful programs similar to those at VMI and VWIL." Id.
138. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2287 (1996). The
majority opinion was written by Justice Ginsburg and was joined by Justices

Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter and Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist
concurred separately and Justice Scalia dissented. Justice Thomas did not
participate because his son attends VMI.

139. Id. at 2276.
140. Id. at 2287.
141. Id. at 2279 (citations omitted). The majority noted that "'[inherent

differences' between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain
cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or
for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity." Id. at 2276.
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While the Court acknowledged the differences between the
sexes, it provided guidance on how those differences can and
cannot be accommodated by the states:
Sex classifications may be used to compensate women "for
particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered," "to
promot[e] equal employment opportunity, to advance full
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people.
But such classifications may not be used, as they once were, to
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women. 142

The Commonwealth asserted two justifications for excluding
women from VMI. First, it argued that a single-sex education
can provide important educational benefits and contribute to
diversity in the educational process. 143 It also asserted that
VMI's unique adversative "method of character development and
leadership training would have to be modified if women were
144
admitted."
In response to the argument that VMI was established and
maintained with a view toward diversifying educational
opportunities, the Court reviewed the historical context in which
VMI was created. 145 When VMI was established in 1839, higher
education for women was considered dangerous. 14 6 The Court
relied on publications at the time reflective of the widely held
view that female reproductive functions were endangered by the
rigors of hard study and academic competition. 147 The Court

142. Id. (citations omitted).
143. Id.

144. Id.
145. Id. at 2277.
146. Id.

147. Id. For example, one study stated that "after five or six weeks of
'mental and educational discipline', a healthy woman would 'lose... the

habit of menstruation' and suffer numerous ills as a result of depriving her
body for the sake of her mind." Id. (quoting C. Meigs, Females and Their
Diseases 350 (1848)). Likewise, another publication stated:

[i]t is not that girls have not ambition, nor that they fail generally to run
the intellectual race ... but it is asserted that they do it at a cost to their
strength and health which entails life-long suffering, and even
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also reviewed the Commonwealth's history with regard to the
provision of education to women within the state and found the
record to be dismal. 14 8 While the Commonwealth created four
all-female schools, the Court characterized the resources and
stature at these schools as being far from equal.1 49 Thus, the
Court failed to find any "persuasive evidence in this record that
VMI's male-only admission policy 'is in furtherance of a state
150
policy of diversity.'"
In support of its argument that the admission of women to VMI
would destroy its unique program, the Commonwealth cited to
three aspects of VMI's program that would be changed: physical
training, the absence of privacy, and the adversative approach. 151
After acknowledging that changes would have to be made, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that average capacities and
preferences of men and women can justify denying "women who
have the will and capacity, the training and attendant
opportunities that VMI uniquely affords." 152 With a
comprehensive summary of the historical justifications for
denying women various opportunities such as practicing law and
medicine, the Court found that the Commonwealth's justification
for excluding women from VMI was not "exceedingly

incapacitates them for the adequate performance of the natural functions
of their sex.
Id. (quoting H. Maudsley, Sex in Mind and in Education 17 (1874)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2278. In addition, all four of the all-female schools became co-

educational by the mid-1970's. Id. The Court also noted that the State's most
prestigious school, the University of Virginia, began to admit women in 1972.
Id.
150. Id. at 2279.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2280. The District Court had found, based on expert opinions.
that "[m]ales tend to need an atmosphere of assertiveness or ritual
combat ...[while] [flemales tend to thrive in a cooperative atmosphere.
United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434 (W.D. Va. 1991),

vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2431 (1993).
aff'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 281 (1995), reved.
116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 [1996], Art. 8

256
persuasive."
producing:

TOURO LAW REVIEW
153

[Vol 13

The Court concluded that VMI's goal of

"citizen-soldiers"... confident in the functions and attitudes of

leadership [can] accommodate women, who today count as
citizens in our American democracy equal in stature to men.
Just as surely, the State's great goal is not substantially advanced
by women's categorical exclusion, in total disregard of their
individual merit, from the State's premier "citizen-soldier"
corps. 154

In addition to determining that VMI's exclusion of women wvas
unconstitutional,
the
Court
addressed
whether
the
Commonwealth's creation of VWIL remedied the constitutional
violation.155 According to the Court, "[a] remedial decree must
closely fit the constitutional violation; it must be shaped to place
persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advantage in
'the position they would have occupied in the absence of
156
discrimination.'
In comparing the benefits and opportunities proposed at VWIL
with those offered at VMI, the Court noted that VWIL requires
lower S.A.T. scores; the school has significantly fewer
instructors with doctorates and they receive significantly lower
salaries than their colleagues at VMI; and its educational
programs are much more limited. 157 The Court determined that
VWIL did not remedy the constitutional violation created by
VMI's exclusion of women. 158

153. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2281.
154. Id. at 2281-82.
155. Id. at 2282.
156. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
157. Id. at 2284. For example, VMI awards baccalaureate degrees in
liberal arts, biology, chemistry, civil engineering, electrical and computer
engineering, and mechanical engineering. Id. VWIL, on the other hand "does
not have a math and science focus." Id.
158. Id. at 2285. The Court concluded that "VWIL does not qualify as
VMI's equal. VWIL's student body, faculty, course offerings, and facilities
hardly match VMI's. Nor can the VWIL graduate anticipate the benefits
associated with VMI's 157-year history, the school's prestige, and its
influential alumni network." Id. at 2284.
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In the end, the Court found that the Fourth Circuit "plainly
erred" in deferentially reviewing the Commonwealth's remedial
plan and further held that all classifications based on gender must
be tested under "heightened scrutiny." 159 Because the alternative
program afforded "women no opportunity to experience the
rigorous military training for which VMI is famed," it could not
be said to have eliminated as far as possible the effects of past
The
discrimination and prevent future discrimination. 160
proposed VWIL program was simply not comparable to the
program offered at VI.
Ultimately, the Court stopped short of ruling that gender
classifications should be tested by the strict scrutiny standard.
However, the Court's analysis seemed to resemble to the strict
scrutiny standard applied to suspect classifications although the
Court did not explicitly use terms which are commonly associated
with the standard applied in strict scrutiny cases, such as the least
restrictive alternative or narrowly tailored classifications.
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with
the Court's ultimate holding but disagreed with the analysis. 161
His main point of contention was that, although the majority
adhered to the test set out in Craig, it made the mistake of
introducing "an element of uncertainty" by requiring the state to
"demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' to support
a gender-based classification." 162 He also disagreed with the
Court's analysis in determining whether the Commonwealth had
proven that its proffered purpose behind the classification, which
163
was diversity in education, was the actual purpose.
While he agreed with the Court that there was little evidence to
support the Commonvealth's justification in maintaining VIAL as
an all-male institution, he would have only considered evidence
that postdated the Court's decision in Hogan.164 Since Hogan
159. Id. at 2286.
160. Id. at 2283.

161. Id. at 2287 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
163. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

164. Id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See supra notes 43 - 55 and
accompanying text.
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put the State on notice that VMI's admissions policy might be
unconstitutional, Chief Justice Rehnquist was of the opinion that
the Commonwealth was entitled to have any decisions with
regard to its admission policy after Hogan held against it since
there was adequate time for the Commonwealth to deal with the
problem. 165
He noted that, even if diversity was the actual purpose behind
the classification, there was still a problem with the
Commonwealth's position. 16 6 "The difficulty with its position is
that the diversity benefited only one sex; there was single-sex
public education available for men at VMI, but no corresponding
167
single-sex public education available for women."
Finally, the Chief Justice disagreed with the way the majority
defined the constitutional violation. 168 The problem with the
way the majority phrased the violation was that it implied that the
only adequate remedy available to the Commonwealth would be
the admission of women to VMI. 169 Rather than define the
violation as the "exclusion of women," he would have phrased it
as the "maintenance of an all-men school without providing any-much less a comparable--institution for women." 170 Therefore,
an adequate remedy according to the Chief Justice "might be a
demonstration by Virginia that its interest in educating men is
matched by its interest in education women at a single-sex
institution." 171
He concluded by stating that VWIL fails as an adequate remedy
"because it is distinctly inferior to the existing men's institution

165.
166.
167.
as well

Id. at 2289-90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("If diversity in the form of single-sex,
as co-educational, institutions of higher learning were to be available to

Virginians, that diversity had to be available to women as well as to men.").

168. Id. at 2291 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), The majority defined the
violation as "the categorical exclusion of women from an extraordinary
education opportunity afforded to men." Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
169. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. VWIL simply
172
is not, in any sense, the institution that VMI is."
Of all the current Supreme Court justices, only Justice Antonin
Scalia defended the Virginia Military Institute's refusal to admit
female cadets, dismissing gender discrimination as less important
than preserving a male-only education dedicated to promoting
manly honor. 173 Justice Scalia lashed out at the majority, calling
174
his colleagues a "self-righteous" band out to destroy VMI.
Ie said the Court was guilty of maling "misleading" and
"irresponsible" statements and "made-up" tests of discrimination
and that they were submitting to "current preferences of the
society. "175
Justice Scalia, considered to be the most conservative member
of the Court was furious and unpleasant as he often is when he
disagrees with the majority. Justice Scalia's constricted "textual"
view of the Constitution was unwilling to concede that some
human progress, such as equal rights for women and AfricanAmericans, was unanticipated by the Founding Fathers over 200
years ago. 17 6 His uncompromising attitude was that our revered
document is static and not subject to evolution or judicial
interpretation.
Justice Scalia said the majority believes, against considerable
evidence, that no substantial educational value is served by the
existence of all-male military academies. 177 He said inherently
172. Id.

173. Id. at 2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe tradition of having
government-funded military schools for men is as well rooted in the traditions
of this country as the tradition of sending only men into military combat
....

the assertion that either tradition has been unconstitutional through the

centuries is not law, but politics-smuggled-into-law.").
174. Id. at 2308 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. The "Scalia theory" is that since the Constitution does not address allmale schools, VMI should continue to deny admissions to women because it
has always done so. Id. at 2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To end that privilege,
he implied, would be to improperly rewrite the Constitution. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("This is not the interpretation of a Constitution, but the creation
of one.").
177. Id. at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ambiguous constitutional provisions such as the equal protection
guarantee should be construed in ways that reflect respect for
"constant and unbroken national traditions" such as educational
diversity that includes some single-sex schools, including maleonly military schools. 178
He noted the majority criticized the "fixed notions" of our
forefathers regarding women's education, 179 but that the majority
favors its own notions so fixedly that it makes them as
constitutional mandates. 180 He notes that the majority faults the
"closed-mindedness" of our forefathers regarding women, but the
majority wields judicial power to abort the system of democratic
persuasion by which the public's mind is kept open. 18 1 He stated
that:
[this] system is destroyed if the smug assurances of each age are
removed from the democratic process and written into the
Constitution. So to counterbalance the Court's criticism of our
ancestors, let me say a word in their praise: they left us free to
change. The same cannot be said of this most illiberal Court,
which has embarked on a course of inscribing one after another
of the current preferences of the society (and in some cases only
the counter-majoritarian preferences of the society's law-trained
elite) into our Basic Law. 182
Beyond that, he excoriates his colleagues for having set a new
and confusing standard for assessing gender discrimination. 183
Their opinion, he asserts, claims to recognize the validity of
differentiating between the sexes but it will make it virtually
impossible to defend those distinctions against charges of
unconstitutionality. 184 Justice Scalia maintains that this ruling
serves as a death sentence for private single-sex colleges, for
special public school programs for boys and for any other gender

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss1/8

32

Stockel: United States v. Virginia

1996]

UNITED STATES v. VIRGINIA

distinction in the law that cannot withstand the strict scrutiny
185
review now applied to race distinctions.
"Today the Court shuts down an institution that has served the
people of the Commonwealth of Virginia with pride and
186
distinction for over a century and a half," wrote Justice Scalia.
He said it is "powerfully impressive" that VMI sought to have its
students live up to a rigorous "[c]ode of a [g]entleman" 187 and
ended his opinion by stating the he does "not think any of us,
women included, will be better off for its destruction." 18 8
CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in United States v. Virginia represents a
victory for the principle of equal opportunity for women at all
levels of education. While the Court attempted to narrow its
decision, 189 the magnitude of the decision may make this case
one of the high-water marks in the twentieth century.
The most obvious and immediate effect occurred on September
21, 1996 when the governing board of VI narrowly decided to
admit women to the institution. 190 In the time period between
the Court's decision and the board's vote to admit women, VMI
had continued to refuse to give applications to interested

185. Id. Justice Scalia stated that "the rationale for today's decision is
sweeping: for sex-based classifications, a redefinition of intermediate
scrutiny that makes it indistinguishable from strict scrutiny.... I suggest

that the single-sex program that will not be capable of being characterized as
'unique' is not only unique but nonexistent." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2309 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. The Court noted that it was addressing "specifically and only an
educational opportunity recognized by the district court and the court of
appeals as 'unique,' an opportunity available only at Virginia's premier
military institute, the State's sole single-sex public university or college." Id.
at 2276 n.7 (citations omitted).
190. The board voted nine to eight in favor of admitting women. Mike
Allen, Defiant V.M.L to Adnit Women But Will Not Ease Rules For Thtem.
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1996, at Al.
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females. 19 1 This decision came about despite vigorous attempts
by VMI alumni to purchase the college from the
Commonwealth. 192 However, the board concluded that the
193
"legal, political and financial hurdles were insurmountable."

Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Virginia has many people debating its long-term effect on the
intermediate standard used by courts to review gender-based

claims under the Constitution. This decision by the Court has
been applauded by many women's rights groups as finally putting
an end to sex discrimination in publicly-funded schools.

194

Some

scholars say the VMI decision imposes a "heightened"
intermediate standard because states now must provide an
"exceedingly
persuasive
justification"
for
any
sex
195
classification,
while other scholars say the Court merely
clarified the standard.

A third view, stated by Chief Justice

Rehnquist in his concurring opinion, is that the decision muddies
the waters. 196

191. Id. at A36. Since the Supreme Court's decision, approximately 80
women had requested application information and they were referred to VMI's
World Wide Web site on the Internet. Id.
192. Id. ("Intent on thwarting coeducation, alumni leaders had spent the
summer trying to raise more than $100 million in an attempt to buy the college
from the State of Virginia, which has provided the institute with one-third of
its $30 million annual budget.").
193. Id.
194. Judy Appelbaum, senior counsel and director of legal programs for the
National Women's Law Center, a Washington, D.C.-based women's rights
legal organization stated "[i]t
is significant that the highest court in the land
has spoken with such a clear voice."
Hope Viner Samborn, Scrutiny
Scrutinized - Case Sparks Debate on Intermediate Scrutiny, A.B.A. J.,
September 1996, at 29.
195. "Justice Ginsburg's opinion in United States v. Virginia makes it quite
clear that the scrutiny employed for gender classifications is quite close to
Martin A. Schwartz, Equal Protection
compelling interest review."
Developments, 216 N.Y. L.J. 55 (1996) (citations omitted). In his dissent,
Justice Scalia said the Court's decision has "drastically revised" the
intermediate standard. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2291
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. See supra notes 161 - 172 and accompanying text.
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The majority attempts to clarify the lingering confusion with
regard to the legal and social parameters of a woman's place in
society and the complex role that educational access plays in
supporting the constitutional value of equality.

However, this

opinion lends itself to possible misinterpretation and distortion.
It also provokes a reactionary response in some people grounded
in traditional views of male and female roles, as evidenced by
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion. 197
From a legal prospective, the majority puts a new spin on over
twenty years of equal protection jurisprudence. Justice Ginsburg
did not simply reaffirm the standard of review applied to gender
classification. Instead, she moved gender equality one step closer
to the more exacting judicial standard applied to classifications
based on race, religion, and national origin. 198 Although not
moving completely to strict scrutiny, the majority nevertheless
restated and applied, with a "bite," the standard used in gender
discrimination cases for the past two decades.
The VMIl case will remain controversial for years to come and
will continue to stir up distinctly different perspectives on the
role the Court should play in pronouncing public values and
shaping public policy through the Constitution. It remains to be
seen whether the Court's heightened standard of review for
gender discrimination cases is but a fleeting departure or a firmly
rooted approach that will influence the future of gender equality.
What is clear, however, is that the Supreme Court has
convincingly spoken out against the categorical exclusion of
either sex based on "traditional" notions of typical male and
female tendencies. The VMI decision supports an expansive
197. See supra notes 173 - 188 and accompanying text.
198. Classifications drawn on the basis of race, religion and national origin,

require the government to demonstrate that its policy is supported by a
compelling governmental interest and represents the least restrictive
alternative. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
("[A]Il legal restrictions which curtain the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect ....[and] courts must subject them to the most rigid
[judicial] scrutiny."); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153

n.4 (1938) (establishing the rationale for more exacting judicial review in
certain cases).
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view of equal educational opportunities for both sexes, a view
that permits educational distinctness and choice so long as the
objective and the result are to provide equal access.
Eric J. Stockel
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